Case Note & Summary
The case arises from a dispute over a tea estate. The appellant, M/s Terai Tea Company Limited, entered into an agreement to sell dated 15th January 1990 with Dhirendra Nath Bhowmick (since deceased) for the purchase of Dharanipur Tea Estate for Rs. 10,11,000/-, paying Rs. 2,11,000/- as part consideration. When Bhowmick failed to execute the conveyance, the appellant filed Suit No. 240 of 1990 for specific performance. An interim injunction was refused, and the appellant appealed. During the appeal, the parties compromised, and the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court passed a consent decree on 2nd August 1991, enhancing the consideration to Rs. 12,11,000/-. Pursuant to this decree, Bhowmick executed a conveyance deed on 3rd August 1991, on which the appellant paid stamp duty of Rs. 1,85,000/- and the full balance consideration. However, it later emerged that an earlier Suit No. 8 of 1984 was pending between Bhowmick and his wife against M/s The New Red Bank Tea Company Private Ltd. regarding the same tea estate. The New Red Bank Tea Company, not a party to Suit No. 240 of 1990, challenged the consent decree in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, by order dated 9th September 1991, set aside the consent decree, holding that both suits should have been tried together, and consequently the conveyance deed stood cancelled. The suits were restored and clubbed. Thereafter, the respondent (defendant in the suit) filed an application to impound the unstamped agreement to sell dated 15th January 1990 under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The Single Judge refused to impound, but the Division Bench of the High Court reversed and directed impounding. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted that the appellant had acted bona fide, paid full consideration and stamp duty on the conveyance, and was entitled to refund of the stamp duty on the cancelled deed. The court held that impounding the agreement at this stage, after the suit had been pending for 29 years, would be unjust and would frustrate the appellant's claim. The court emphasized that Section 35 of the Stamp Act is not mandatory but discretionary, and in the peculiar facts, the discretion should not be exercised to impound. The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench's order and restored the Single Judge's order, allowing the suit to proceed on merits without impounding the agreement.
Headnote
A) Stamp Act - Impounding of Document - Section 35 of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 - Discretion of Court - The court held that impounding of an unstamped document under Section 35 is not mandatory but discretionary, and in the peculiar facts where the appellant had paid full stamp duty on a conveyance deed that was subsequently cancelled, impounding the underlying agreement would be unjust and frustrate the claim. (Paras 16-18) B) Stamp Act - Refund of Stamp Duty - Cancelled Conveyance Deed - The appellant paid stamp duty of Rs. 1,85,000/- on a conveyance deed executed pursuant to a consent decree that was later set aside by the Supreme Court. The court held that the appellant is entitled to seek refund of that stamp duty, and no one disputed this right. (Paras 7, 16) C) Civil Procedure - Consent Decree - Setting Aside - Effect on Conveyance - Where a consent decree for specific performance is set aside by a higher court, the conveyance deed executed in furtherance thereof also stands cancelled, but the underlying agreement to sell remains a live issue in the suit. (Paras 6, 15) D) Specific Performance - Suit Pending for 29 Years - Non-Suiting - The court observed that impounding the agreement at this stage would effectively non-suit the appellant after the suit had been pending for almost 29 years, which would be unjust. (Para 10)
Issue of Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in directing impounding of an unstamped agreement to sell dated 15th January, 1990 during pendency of a suit for specific performance, where the appellant had already paid stamp duty on a subsequent conveyance deed that was cancelled due to setting aside of consent decree.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the order of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated 13th April 2017, and restored the order of the Single Judge dated 14th February 2017, thereby refusing to impound the agreement to sell dated 15th January 1990. The court directed that the suit proceed on merits without impounding the document.
Law Points
- Impounding of document under Section 35 of Indian Stamp Act
- 1899 is discretionary
- not mandatory
- court may refuse to impound if it would cause injustice or frustrate the claim
- refund of stamp duty on cancelled conveyance deed is permissible
- consent decree set aside does not automatically render underlying agreement inadmissible



